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Abstract
Sorkin’s coevents [30] can be thought of as the ‘beables’ of a quantum histories theory [29]; in
this paper we study the ‘logical’ implications of taking this claim at face value, constructing
a propositional lattice for the space of coevents applicable to a given histories theory and
comparing it to the more traditional propositional lattice of events. In particular we focus
on multiplicative coevents, and find that the precise nature of their anhomomorphism leads
to a particularly simple relationship between the two propositional lattices. Finally, we
notice that our constructions contain elements intuitively similar to topos nations of truth
values and use this to suggest a means of applying Isham’s topos theoretic constructions
[22, 3] to multiplicative coevents.
1 Introduction
1.1 Opening Remarks
Quantum measure theory [27, 28] rephrases the histories approach to quantum me-
chanics [21, 11, 25, 25] as a generalization of a classical probability theory, with a
sample space consisting of the spacetime paths introduced by Dirac [2] and Feyn-
man [8, 9]. A naive application of the classical ‘one history is real’ interpretation
is obstructed by the Kochen-Specker theorem [7, 24], leading to the development of
various alternative interpretations.
Perhaps the most prominent of these alternatives is the consistent histories in-
terpretation [14, 15, 16, 17], more recently topos based ideas have also been in-
troduced [22, 3, 4, 5, 6, 1, 10, 23]. Sorkin has proposed the coevent interpreta-
tion [30, 29, 26, 13, 7, 12, 18, 19, 20], focusing on truth valuation maps (coevents)
φ : Σ → Z2 from the event algebra of a histories theory to the truth value space
Z2. In this context the classical ‘one history is real’ can be rephrased as ‘φ is a
homomorphism’, the generalisation of which leads to the ‘anhomomorphic logic’ of
‘non-classical coevents’.
1.2 Goals and Outline of this Paper
In [29] Sorkin has proposed two ways of understanding the ontology of the coevent
interpretation, firstly that histories are the beables with coevents describing a ‘non-
classical’, ‘anhomomorphic’ logical framework. Alternatively we might regard the
coevents themselves as the beables, in which case we are able to use a ‘standard’ or
‘classical’ logical framework. In this paper we take the first steps toward a rigorous
implementation of the second approach, examining ‘logical’ implications of taking
coevents seriously as beables. Following from [13] in which we examine the construc-
tion of dynamics for coevents, we now turn to the ‘logical structure’ of propositions
concerning coevents and their relationship with propositions concerning histories.
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Our use of the phrase ‘logical structure’ itself requires some interpretation; we will
understand it to refer to the lattice structure of a set of propositions. In the case of a
probability or histories theory we will expect our propositional lattice to be the event
algebra ordered by inclusion, with the lattice structure defined by the order relation.
We will formalise the notion of the ‘threefold character’ of logic discussed in [29] by
extending the idea of a logical structure to a logical framework ; associating with our
propositional lattice Σ a truth value space T and a set of ‘allowed’ truth valuation
functions V from the lattice to this space1 (which for our purposes will always be
Z2) to yield a triple (Σ,V ,T). For example, the lattice structure of a histories event
algebra together with Z2 and a coevent scheme [12] constitutes a logical framework for
a histories theory. In what follows we will construct logical frameworks for coevents
themselves, and examine how these relate to the logical frameworks of the associated
histories theories.
In section 1.3 we review classical probability theories, rephrasing them in a man-
ner which anticipates quantum measure theory and the coevent interpretation. In
section 1.4 we briefly review quantum measure theory and in 1.5 we introduce co-
events and the multiplicative scheme. In section 2 we undertake our central task of
constructing logical frameworks for coevents and examining their relationship with
propositions concerning histories. In section 2.1 we lay out our general construction,
while in section 2.3 we carefully apply it to multiplicative coevents. In section 3 we
note that a key piece of our construction is reminiscent of elements of topos theory,
leading us to examine the applicability of such methods to the coevent interpretation
and the analysis of section 2. We conclude in section 4.
1.3 Classical Physics
1.3.1 Classical Dynamics: Probability Theories
We begin by describing classical dynamics and ontology as a starting point from
which to generalise to quantum theories. A classical probability theory is a triple
(Ω,Σ,P), where Ω is the sample space, Σ the event algebra and P the (probability)
measure.
The sample space is in a sense our most basic object, and can for our purposes
be thought of as the space of full specifications of the system under study; looking
ahead we denote the elements of the sample space as histories. For example if we are
studying a single throw of a ‘fair coin’ our sample space will be {h, t} = {heads, tails},
if we consider two throws we will have Ω = {hh, ht, th, tt}. In what follows we will
for simplicity assume that Ω is finite.
The event algebra Σ ⊂ 2Ω can be thought of as the space of propositions we
make concerning the system, we often take Σ to be a sigma subalgebra of 2Σ but
when Ω is finite we can use the whole space Σ = 2Ω. Set inclusion equips the event
algebra with a natural partial order, A ≤ B ⇔ A ⊂ B, which is easily seen to
make Σ a Boolean lattice where meet, join and complement are equivalent to the set
relations intersection, union and complement respectively; this lattice structure can
be thought of as the natural ‘logical structure’ of our space of propositions. We will in
what follows use lattice structure synonymously with ‘logical structure’, thinking of
the former as a concrete realisation of the latter. Notice that by writing AB = A∩B
and A+B = A△B (where △ denotes the symmetric difference) we can formulate Σ
as an algebra over Z2.
Finally the dynamics are encoded in the probability measure P, a positive real
valued function on the event algebra with normalisation P(Ω) = 1 obeying the Kol-
1Note that since domain and range are inherent in the definition of a function the propositional
lattice and truth valuation space are redundant in a logical framework. We will however continue
to explicitly include them for clarity.
2
mogorov sun rule,
P(A ⊔B) = P(A) + P(B), (1)
for all disjoint A,B ∈ Σ, where ⊔ denotes disjoint union. Notice that P encodes all
dynamical information, including ‘initial conditions’.
1.3.2 Classical Ontology: Truth Valuation Maps
The ontology of this classical theory can be summed up in the statement that a single
element r ∈ Ω of the sample space is deemed to be ‘real ’. Events which contain this
real history are said to be true while events which do not contain it are said to be
false. Now in general we do not know which event ‘really happens’, so we construct
the space of potentially real events, which we call the ontology of our theory; we will
denote elements of this set as potential realities or beables. Note that our choice of
ontology is affected by our knowledge concerning the system; if we know that the
real event is r then our ontology is simply {r}, if we can place no restriction on
which event is real then our ontology will be the full sample space Ω. In general
the information we have about the system is represented by the dynamics (which as
we have seen includes initial conditions), which in our classical probability theories
means the probability measure P. There is some discussion around the interpretation
of probability and its relationship to ontology; we will simply use the most basic
connection, the concept of preclusion which requires events of measure zero to be
‘false’. From the above this immediately implies that no element of a measure zero
set can be ‘real’, so our ontology now becomes the set,
{γ ∈ Ω | ∄A ∋ γ such that P(A) = 0}. (2)
We can now construct a ‘logical framework’ for (Ω,Σ,P); we have already iden-
tified the lattice Σ as the ‘logical structure’, we now use the ontology to provide our
‘allowed’ truth values. We have seen that if the ‘real’ history is r ∈ Ω then any event
A ∈ Σ containing r is ‘true’ and every event not containing r is ‘false’. Identifying
the ‘truth value space’ {false, true} with {0, 1} = Z2, this directly defines a truth
valuation function which we will call r∗,
r∗ : Σ → {false, true} = {0, 1} = Z2
r∗(A) =
{
1 r ∈ A
0 r 6∈ A
(3)
Now notice that Z2 is a Boolean lattice (and thus an algebra over Z2), it is easy to
see that these ‘classical’ truth valuation maps are lattice (and thus algebra) homo-
morphisms; in fact they are all the homomorphisms,
{γ∗ | γ ∈ Ω} = Hom(Σ,Z2), (4)
where Hom(A,B) is the space of homomorphisms from the lattice (algebra) A to
the lattice (algebra) B.
Finally, we can translate the concept of preclusion into our truth valuation per-
spective. The requirement that dynamically precluded events are also ontologically
precluded sits naturally with an ontology of truth valuation functions, we simply
require that for truth valuation map r∗ to be part of our ontology it must satisfy,
P(A) = 0⇒ r∗(A) = 0. (5)
We call such maps preclusive, and will label the set of preclusive homomorphisms from
the event algebra to Z2 by C(Ω,Σ,P). We can then think of the triple (Σ, C(Ω,Σ,P),Z2)
as our logical framework.
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1.4 Quantum Dynamics
1.4.1 Quantum Measures: Histories Theories
We must generalise the above structure to accommodate quantum dynamics; we
begin by generalising a classical probability theory to a histories theory (Ω,Σ, µ),
where as before Ω is our sample space, or histories space, which we will assume to
be finite, and the Boolean lattice Σ = 2Ω is our event algebra of propositions. We
have however generalised the dynamics from a probability measure to a quantum
measure µ which does not necessarily obey the Kolmogorov sum rule but instead is
constrained by the level 2 sum rule. More formally we call µ : Σ → R a quantum
measure if it obeys,
µ(A) ≥ 0
µ(Ω) = 1
µ(A ⊔B ⊔ C) = µ(A ⊔B) + µ(B ⊔ C) + µ(C ⊔ A)
−µ(A)− µ(B) − µ(C). (6)
A quantum measure is similar in dynamical content to the more standard deco-
herence functional D : Σ× Σ→ C from which it can be derived,
µ(A) = D(A,A). (7)
We refer to a partition Λ of Ω as a coarse graining (and Ω is called a fine graining
of Λ); Λ generates a Boolean subalgebra ΣΛ of Σ to which we can restrict the measure
leading to the coarse grained histories theory (Λ,ΣΛ, µΛ). In some cases the restric-
tion of the measure to a particular subalgebra ΣΛ might obey the Kolmogorov sum
rule, so that the coarse grained theory (Λ,ΣΛ, µΛ) is a classical probability theory.
We call such subalgebras (and their associated partitions) dynamically classical or
decoherent.
1.5 Coevents
1.5.1 Basic Definitions
It is not clear how we might naively apply the classical structures defined above to
a general quantum histories theory; in particular there are several no-go theorems
obstructing the use of a single history as a truth valuation map. Given a histories
theory (Ω,Σ, µ) we translate the concept of preclusion to µ(A) = 0⇒ γ∗(A) = 0 for
γ ∈ Ω, allowing us to define C(Ω,Σ, µ) as we did for classical probability theories.
Then it is possible to find gedanken-experimentally realisable systems (based for
example on the Kochen-Specker Theorem [7]) in which the sample space is covered
by null sets, leading to C(Ω,Σ, µ) = ∅.
The co-event approach generalises from classical homomorphic truth valuation
maps to arbitrary maps from the event algebra to Z2.
Definition 1. Let (Ω,Σ, µ) be a histories theory, then we refer to a map,
φ : Σ→ Z2,
as a coevent; we denote the space of coevents by Σ⋄. A coevent is preclusive if
µ(A) = 0⇒ φ(A) = 0 ∀A ∈ Σ.
Because our coevents can be anhomomorphic we have to pay close attention
to difference between the ‘logic’ (lattice structure) in the domains and the truth
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value space; as always we must be careful to distinguish both from our ‘meta-logic’2.
For example, when discussing the multiplicative scheme, and using → to denote
implication3 in Σ and  to denote implication in the truth value space (Z2), we can
write Modus Ponens as
(A→ B)⇒ (φ(A) φ(B)). (8)
To avoid confusion we will use the symbols uprise,g,⇁, to denote meet, join, com-
plement and implication in the truth value space to emphasise that these operations
are distinct from those in the event algebra.
If a coevent is a homomorphism we say that it is classical, thus C(Ω,Σ, µ) is
the space of classical, preclusive coevents over the histories theory (Ω,Σ, µ). As we
have seen above, in a classical probability theory (when µ is decoherent on all of Σ)
we consider C(Ω,Σ, µ) to be the set of ‘dynamically allowed’ coevents. In a general
histories theory we will take some subset V ⊆ Σ⋄ as the set of allowed coevents;
various means have been suggested for choosing this subset. The choice of V is
referred to as a coevent scheme.
1.5.2 The Multiplicative Scheme
The current ‘standard approach’ is known as the multiplicative scheme, which places
a sequence of restrictions on Σ⋄. First, we say that a coevent is multiplicative if,
φ(A ∧B) = φ(A) uprise φ(B) ∀A,B ∈ Σ. (9)
Now regarding both Σ and Z2 as algebras over Z2 we have A∧B = AB and φ(A)uprise
φ(B) = φ(A)φ(B), keading us to rephrase the above condition as,
φ(AB) = φ(A)φ(B) ∀A,B ∈ Σ, (10)
which makes the choice of the term ‘multiplicative’ more clear. We denote the space
of multiplicative coevents by Σ∗. In terms of the logical structure, multiplicative
coevents preserve the ‘AND’ but not the ‘OR’ relation, in other words they preserve
meets but not joins; we will return to this topic in later sections.
It is easy to see that the support of a multiplicative coevent is a filter [13], a
property which will be key in what follows. Because Ω is finite the filter φ−1(1) has
a principal element, which we denote φ∗. This leads to a map ∗ : Σ∗ → Σ with
∗ : φ 7→ φ∗, which can be extended to a involution on Σ×Σ∗ by defining ∗ : Σ→ Σ∗
with ∗ : A 7→ A∗ where for all B ∈ Σ,
A∗(B) =
{
1 if A ⊆ B
0 otherwise
(11)
It is easy to check that φ is bijective and that (φ∗)∗ = φ and (A∗)∗ = A; we can
therefore think of ∗ as a duality.
2 Coevents as Beables
2.1 The General Construction
As stated above our aim is to examine the logical implications of interpreting coevents
as beables. If we are to take a set of coevents seriously as our ontology then we
must reconfigure the construction of our physical theories and reasoning accordingly.
2Our meta-logic includes the mathematical reasoning we use to discuss the logical structures
under examination.
3We can define implication in a Boolean lattice in the standard fashion, A → B = ¬A ∨ B.
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Taking coevents as the ‘genuine’ beables and relegating histories to the category
of emergent constructs makes it natural to formulate theories and interpretations
thereof in terms of coevents rather than histories. We might for example seek a
theory of the form (V , 2V ,Π), where Π is a generalised measure4 on 2V . Ideally
this shift to the ‘genuine’ beables would lead to a simpler dynamics, perhaps even
a probability measure; however efforts to construct such a probability measure have
encountered obstructions [13].
In this paper we will focus not on the dynamics of coevents but on their associated
logical framework. Indeed if V is truly to be regarded as the ontology then it would
perhaps be more accurate to think of events in Σ as valuations on 2V . To avoid
confusion we will distinguish between the ‘original’ histories event algebra Σ, whose
elements we will call histories events, and the valuation event algebra 2V whose
elements we will call valuation events. Notice that Σ and 2V are both Boolean
lattices under the ordering defined by inclusion. To formulate a logical framework
for valuation events we begin by considering the following points,
1. In the coevent literature [30, 29, 26, 13, 7, 12] no attempt is made to apply
‘non-standard’ reasoning to coevents. We could say that ‘standard meta-logic’
is applied to coevents.
2. To formally construct a logical framework for coevents we must carefully ‘move’
our reasoning from the realm of ‘meta-logic’ to that of an ‘object logic’; a formal
mathematical structure (which we will in turn describe using our meta-language
and meta-logic).
3. Inspired by our treatment of classical histories theories (section 1.3.2) we choose
to implement ‘standard meta-logic’ as a Boolean lattice of propositions associ-
ated with homomorphic truth valuations from the whole space to Z2. Following
section 1.3.2 we expect our propositional lattice to correspond to the event al-
gebra ordered by inclusion.
This leads us to use (2V , Hom(2V ,Z2),Z2) as the logical framework for our new
beables. We will use f to denote a general member of Hom(2V ,Z2), and fφ ∈
Hom(2V ,Z2) to denote the unique map taking φ ∈ V to 1.
However, even if we identify 2V as the ‘genuine’ event algebra, it is the events
in Σ to which we have experimental access, and around which we have developed
dynamical theories. Taking coevents as the beables suggests that the histories events
are constructs built of valuation events; we therefore seek to represent a histories
event A ∈ Σ with a valuation event. In other words we want a map,
τ : Σ→ 2V . (12)
The key to defining τ is a shift in focus from the unevaluated proposition ‘A’(∈ Σ) to
the evaluated proposition ‘φ(A) = 1’, leading us to interpret ‘A is true’ as meaning
‘the true valuation maps A to 1’. To facilitate this we define,
τ(A) = {φ ∈ V | φ(A) = 1}
= supp(A), (13)
where supp(A) denotes the support of A considered as a map on 2V ,
A : 2V → Z2
A(φ) = φ(A). (14)
4A generalised measure is not necessarily classical or quantum [27]
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Now if we do not know which valuation is ‘real’, but do know that a particular histo-
ries event A ∈ Σ is true, then we can assert that τ(A) is true, yielding a translation
of histories events into valuation events,
φ(A) = 1⇔ fφ(A) = 1. (15)
Notice that when τ is injective we can define two order structures on τ(Σ) =
{τ(A) | A ∈ Σ}. We have the order ‘pushed forward’ from Σ,
τ(A) ≤τ τ(B)⇔ A ≤ B, (16)
and the order inherited from 2V , which is defined by inclusion,
τ(A) ≤⊆ τ(B)⇔ τ(A) ⊆ τ(B). (17)
If τ is not injective ≤⊆ is unaffected, however we will have to check that ≤τ is well
defined. As we shall see below the relationship between these two orders is a means
of expressing the properties of whichever coevent scheme we are considering. We will
explore the realisation of these ideas below by considering the concrete example of
multiplicative coevents.
2.2 Multiplicative Coevents
2.2.1 Constructing the Map τ
To specify τ we must first examine the order structure of multiplicative coevents
more closely. Given a histories theory (Ω,Σ, µ) the set of all multiplicative coevents
is
Σ∗ = {A∗ | A ∈ Σ}. (18)
As we have seen in section 1.5.2 the map ∗ is an involution on Σ× Σ∗ and can thus
be thought of as a duality. This leads us to define an ‘inverse’ ordering on Σ∗,
A∗ ≤ B∗ ⇔ A ≥ B. (19)
We now introduce the maps ↑ (and ↓) sending a poset P to 2P , such that each
element is sent to the set of elements greater than (less than) or equal to it. Thus
for example we have,
↑: P → 2P
↑ (p) = {q ∈ P | q ≥ p}. (20)
We call the sets ↑ (p) filters, and will denote the space of such filters in Σ by F ⊂ 2Σ.
Similarly we will denote the space of filters in Σ∗ by F∗ ⊂ 2Σ
∗
. Note that because ∗
is order-reversing we have,
(↑ (A))∗ = ↓ (A∗)
(↓ (A))∗ = ↑ (A∗). (21)
Then using (11) it is easy to see that,
supp(A) = {B∗ | B ⊆ A}
= {B∗ | B ≤ A}
= (↓ (A))∗
= ↑ (A∗). (22)
This leads us to,
τ : Σ → F∗
τ(A) = ↑ (A∗). (23)
It is easy to check that τ is injective.
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2.2.2 The Order Structure of τ(Σ)
We have established F∗ = τ(Σ) as the ‘genuine’ set of valuation events which we
are ‘actually’ accessing when we discuss histories events; we now turn to the order
structure of this set. We have two ‘natural’ orders on F∗, the first pushed forward
from Σ and the second inherited from 2Σ
∗
.
1. Since τ is injective onto F∗ we can push forward the order, and thus lattice,
structure of Σ,
τ(A) ≤τ τ(B)⇔ A ≤ B (24)
This makes τ a lattice isomorphism onto F∗ using the order ≤τ and the related
operations ∧τ ,∨τ .
2. It is easy to see that 2Σ
∗
is a Boolean lattice using the standard inclusion
ordering (α ≤⊆ β ⇔ α ⊆ β). Then F∗ ⊂ 2Σ
∗
inherits this ordering. Note that
in general a subposet need not be a sublattice, for example the subposet may
not contain meets and joins defined using the ambient space ordering.
We can now compare these two orderings. We have,
τ(A) ≤τ τ(B) ⇔ A ≤ B
⇔ A∗ ≥ B∗
⇔ ↑ (A∗) ⊆↑ (B∗)
⇔ τ(A) ≤⊆ τ(B) (25)
so that ≤τ=≤⊆ |F∗ ; the ordering pushed forward from the histories event algebra
is the same as the order inherited from the coevent algebra. We can then think of
∧τ and ∨τ as being defined by taking sup’s and inf’s within F∗ using the inherited
order. However there is no guarantee that the inf’s and sup’s taken within F∗ are
the same as those taken within 2Σ
∗
, since for example an inf within F∗ is the greatest
among elements contained in F∗ whereas an inf in 2Σ
∗
is free to consider elements
not in F∗.
We must check whether meets and joins defined by ≤⊆ in 2Σ
∗
are equivalent to
those defined by its restriction to F∗. We begin with meets,
τ(A) ∧⊆ τ(B) = τ(A) ∩ τ(B)
= ↑ (A∗)∩ ↑ (B∗)
= ↑ (A∗ ∨B∗)
= ↑ ((A ∧B)∗)
= τ(A ∧B)
= τ(A) ∧τ τ(B) (26)
by the definition of ∧τ . However turning to joins we have,
↑ (A∗)∪ ↑ (B∗) 6=↑ (A∗ ∧B∗) (27)
and thus
τ(A) ∨⊆ τ(B) 6= τ(A) ∨τ τ(B). (28)
In fact for general A,B ∈ Σ,
τ(A) ∨⊆ τ(B) = τ(A) ∪ τ(B) * F∗. (29)
Thus ≤τ and ≤⊆ agree on meets but not on joins. In terms on order structure this is
essentially because the intersection of two filters is a filter whereas the union of two
filters is not a filter.
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Another way of looking at this would be to think of F∗ as being closed under ≤⊆
meets but not joins. We can of course complete F∗ by taking its closure under ≤⊆
joins (and meets), which we will call U ⊂ 2Σ
∗
, or its closure under ≤⊆ joins and set
complements (and meets), which we will call C. Looking forward to section 3.3 we
note that any α ∈ U is an upper set and that U itself is a Heyting algebra (since it
is a locale), but not in general a Boolean algebra, whereas C is Boolean.
2.2.3 Truth Functions
Taking valuations seriously as beables we have shifted from histories events in Σ to
valuation events in 2Σ
∗
, and have interpreted the elements of Σ in terms of 2Σ
∗
by
use of τ . Further, we have seen that we can extend τ(Σ) to U (or C) if we wish to
use joins (or complements) on the statements in τ(Σ) using the ‘genuine’ ordering
in 2Σ
∗
as opposed to the ordering pushed forward from Σ. Though this may at first
appear relatively involved, it is a necessary step in the formalisation of statements
that are quite typical concerning coevents. We are assuming that there is a single
‘real’ coevent5, however we do not know which element of Σ∗ (or M(Ω,Σ, µ)) is the
‘real’ one. Then to say that ‘the real coevent maps A ∈ Σ and to 1 or it maps B ∈ Σ
to 1’ requires the use of U . It is perhaps more clear if we turn this around; histories
events A ∈ Σ are used to give us information which narrows down the possibilities
of which coevent is real, so that φ(A) = 1 means that fφ(τ(A)) = 1, in other words
‘the real coevent is in τ(A)’. But what if we have information about more than one
event? As we will see below, though we can make statements such as ‘A is true and
B is true’ using only τ(Σ), to make the statement ‘A is true or B is true’ we will
need U .
More rigorously, the statement ‘A is true and B is true’ translates to φ(A) uprise
φ(B) = 1, whereas ‘A is true or B is true’ translates to φ(A) g φ(B) = 1. We begin
with the first statement, recalling that fφ is a homomorphism and using (25) we
have,
φ(A) uprise φ(B) = fφ(τ(A)) uprise fφ(τ(B))
= fφ(τ(A) ∧ τ(B))
= fφ(τ(A ∧B))
= φ(A ∧B). (30)
Our algebraic structures thus lead us back to the defining property of multiplicative
coevents. Turning to the second statement we have,
φ(A) g φ(B) = fφ(τ(A)) g fφ(τ(B))
= fφ(τ(A) ∨ τ(B))
6= fφ(τ(A ∨B))
= φ(A ∨B). (31)
This embodies the anhomomorphism of multiplicative coevents, and makes it clear
that this anhomomorphism directly reflects the difference between the lattice struc-
tures induced by the orders ≤τ and ≤⊆ on τ(Σ). If we focused only on Σ we might
conclude that intuitively multiplicative coevents were consistent with the ‘AND’
(meet) but not the ‘OR’ (join) logical operator; however since we are taking 2Σ
∗
as the ‘genuine’ event algebra we are able to use (τ(A) ∨ τ(B)) ∈ U ⊆ 2Σ
∗
as a
formal proposition. As mentioned above, propositions of this form are already used
in the analysis of coevents, we have simply moved these propositions from the realm
of ‘meta-logic’ into our formal ‘object-logic’.
5We take the assumption of homomorphic truth valuation functions as equivalent to the assump-
tion that exactly one coevent is ‘real’.
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2.2.4 The Multiplicative Scheme
Let (Ω,Σ, µ) be a histories theory, if we have full knowledge of the dynamics µ then
instead of Σ∗ we might useM(Ω,Σ, µ) as our ontology. Note thatM(Ω,Σ, µ) ⊂ Σ∗,
so that 2M(Ω,Σ,µ) is a Boolean sublattice of 2Σ
∗
. As before we define,
τ : Σ → 2M(Ω,Σ,µ)
τ(A) = supp(A) = {φ ∈ M(Ω,Σ, µ) | φ(A) = 1}. (32)
Then unlike the case for general multiplicative coevents τ will not in general be
injective. However because every supp(φ) is a filter in Σ for every φ ∈ M(Ω,Σ, µ),
for A,B ∈ Σ we have
φ(A) = 1, A ≤ B ⇒ φ(B) = 1. (33)
This implies,
supp(A) ⊆ supp(B) (34)
which means,
A ≤ B ⇒ τ(A) ≤⊆ τ(B), (35)
and thus that the ‘push forward’ order is well defined, ≤τ=≤⊆ |2M(Ω,Σ,µ) . Then
from here on the multiplicative scheme will behave in the same way as multiplicative
coevents, yielding the same results.
2.2.5 General Coevents
A natural question is how the above results generalise to arbitrary coevent schemes.
A general coevent is a map φ : Σ→ Z2, and a general coevent scheme is an arbitrary
set of coevents,
V ⊆ {φ | φ : Σ→ Z2}. (36)
As before we can define our map,
τ : Σ → 2V
τ(A) = supp(A). (37)
However since V is an arbitrary set of coevents we do not know if τ is injective, or
more generally whether the ordering ≤τ is well defined. Further, even if we restrict
to the case in which ≤τ is well defined, we can not in general relate the orders ≤τ and
≤⊆, leaving our analysis somewhat sterile. We can of course note that τ(Σ) ⊂ 2V and
formally construct the truth functions fφ, however there is not much else of interest
we can say in general using the above approach.
3 The Applicability of Topos Methods
3.1 Opening Comments
The map τ defined above takes a histories event A ∈ Σ and returns the set of coevents
which send that event to ‘true’. Intuitively, we could think of τ(A) as representing the
‘location’ in which A is true. This is reminiscent of the topos interpretation of truth
valuations, which can be thought of as returning a location in which a proposition
might be true6. This suggests the applicability of topos methods; we shall very
briefly ask whether and in what manner the extensive machinery of topos theory can
be brought to bear on our coevent constructions, we shall leave the actual exploration
and interpretation of topos constructions for coevents to further research.
6A location at which it is well defined to state that the proposition in question is true.
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We follow the application of topos theory to physics discussed by Isham, Butter-
field, Do¨ring, Flori and others [22, 3, 4, 5, 6, 1, 10, 23], in particular Isham’s early
application of topos methods to the histories approach as described in [22]; this anal-
ysis giving us an application of topos methods to structures similar to the ones we are
considering. Isham’s later work with Do¨ring [3, 4, 5, 6] expands on these initial ideas
to propose a more comprehensive and far reaching framework whose application to
our problems is beyond the scope of this paper, though it may well be grounds for
fruitful future research.
3.2 The Topos of Varying Sets
3.2.1 Varying Sets
We will briefly outline the varying set structure used in [22]. For simplicity and
accessibility we will suppress much of the actual topos theoretic intuition and follow
the focus of this paper by concentrating on order structure; a fuller account is of
course to be found in [22].
Our central object is△PQ, the constant varying set over P, which we can perhaps
think of as a poset P (which we will assume to be finite) foliated with copies of a set
Q.
△PQ : P → 2
Q
△PQ(p) = Q (38)
We call a map ̟ : P → 2Q a subobject of △PQ if,
p ≤ q ⇒ ̟(p) ⊆ ̟(q). (39)
Constant varying sets (and their subobjects) are objects within the topos SetsP,
which more generally contains varying sets over P. We can think of a varying set
X over a poset P as the association of a set X(p) with each element of p ∈ P , and
the association with every pair p ≤ q of a map Xpq : X(p) → X(q) satisfying the
conditions,
1. Xpp is the identity map.
2. p ≤ q ≤ r ⇒ Xpq = Xrq ◦Xpr.
Thus setting X(p) = Q ∀p ∈ P and defining the map Xpq to be inclusion we get
X = △PQ.
Now let p ∈ P be an element of a poset P , we will denote by U(p) ⊂ 2P the set
of all upper sets above p; then given A ∈ 2P we have A ∈ U(p) iff,
1. r ∈ A⇒ r ≥ p.
2. r ∈ A, r′ ≥ r ⇒ r′ ∈ A.
Upper sets are the realisation in this context of the more general topos concept of
sieves [22]. We will denote the union of all upper sets in P by U(P ).
3.2.2 The Sub-Object Classifier
We are now in a position to introduce the sub-object classifier O, a key object in
topos theory which can be thought of as the space of truth values for the topos in
question. In our case O will be the object which associates U(p) with every p ∈ P ,
O(p) = U(p), equipped with the natural map Opq : O(p)→ O(q) defined by,
Opq(A) = A∩ ↑ (q). (40)
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Now if our poset contains only one element, P = {p}, then the constant varying
set △P is simply the set Q associated to the point p, and a subobject A is simply
a subset A ⊆ Q (associated with p). Clearly this structure is analogous to standard
set theory. Our subobject classifier in this case associates to p the two upper sets ∅
and {p}, which we can label 0 and 1 respectively; it is easy to see that the natural
Heyting algebra7 of O is then equivalent to the Boolean algebra Z2. Following the
standard set theory practise we can construct characteristic maps for each subset
A ⊆ Q,
χA : Q (= △P (p)) → Z2 (= O(p))
χA(x) =
{
1 x ∈ A
0 x 6∈ A
(41)
The map χA can be thought of as evaluating the proposition x ∈ A and returning
‘true’ or ‘false’. However, our varying set structure allows us to reinterpret χ; noting
that the subset A corresponds to a subobject A(p) and recalling that in our subobject
classifier 0 = ∅ and 1 = {p}, we could equivalently write,
χA(x) = {q ∈ P | x ∈ A(q)},
so that χ picks out the location at which x ∈ A is true. Then the identification of ∅
with 0 and {p} with 1 allows us to think of these locations as Z2 truth values. Though
this may seem an unnecessary complication when P contains only one element, we
can use this idea to generalise to,
χA : △P → O, (42)
where the map acts on each of the sets associated with the elements of P ,
χAp : △P (p) → O(p)
χAp (x) = {q ≥ p | x ∈ A(q)}. (43)
Intuitively we have shifted from asking ‘is x in A?’ to ‘(given p) at what locations
(above p) is x in A?’8.
3.3 Topos for multiplicative coevents
We now ask whether and how the above mechanism might apply to multiplicative
coevents. As we are taking coevents as our beables we want ‘truth locations’ to be sets
of coevents. This suggests that our ‘base’ poset should be made up of multiplicative
coevents; Σ∗ is the natural choice. This places us within the topos SetsΣ
∗
, then
following [22] we will single out a constant varying set in this topos and represent
our physical theory as a subobject of this constant varying set. Since the propositions
accessible to us are histories events we are led to,
△Σ∗ : Σ∗ → 2Σ
△Σ∗(φ) = Σ. (44)
We turned to topos theory because τ(A) intuitively seems like a ‘truth location’;
in particular for multiplicative coevents τ(A) is a filter and thus an upper set in Σ∗,
matching the structure of ‘truth locations’ in SetsΣ
∗
. We then seek a subobject of
△Σ∗ intuitively corresponding to τ(A); the most obvious choice is,
△supp : Σ∗ → 2Σ
△supp(φ) = supp(φ). (45)
7See [22] for further details.
8Or perhaps ‘under what conditions is x in A?’.
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Now,
A∗ ≤ B∗ ⇒ A ≥ B
⇒ ↑ (A) ⊆↑ (B)
⇒ supp(A∗) ⊆ supp(B∗), (46)
so that △supp is a genuine subobject of △Σ∗. Then our characteristic map is,
χ
△supp
B∗ = {C
∗ ≥ B∗ | A ∈ supp(C∗)}. (47)
Then noting the duality between a coevent acting on an event and an event acting
on a coevent we see that A ∈ supp(C∗)⇔ C∗ ∈ supp(A) = τ(A), so that,
χ
△supp
B∗ = {C
∗ ≥ B∗ | C∗ ∈ τ(A)}
= ↑ (B∗)∩ ↑ (A∗)
= τ(A ∧B). (48)
Alternately we could write this as,
χ
△supp
φ (A) = τ(A ∧ φ
∗). (49)
This implements the conception of ‘partial’ or ‘contextual’ truth [22]; since our base
poset is Σ∗ itself the coevents φ ∈ Σ∗ act as the ‘contexts’ for our propositions A ∈ Σ.
If we continue to follow [22] we would then assemble these ‘local’ characteristic
maps in to a global element of O which could be regarded as a ‘valuation’ of pairs
(A, φ) where A ∈ Σ and φ ∈ Σ∗. The details are unnecessary for our analysis, so we
will simply note that intuitively this valuation assigns χ△suppφ (A) = τ(A∧φ
∗) to the
pair (A, φ).
3.4 Discussion
First we note that the above construction depends on the properties of Σ∗, in particu-
lar (46) shows that△supp is a subobject of△Σ∗ by using properties of multiplicative
coevents which do not generalise to arbitrary coevents. Thus we can not generalise
the above construction to arbitrary coevents schemes.
Secondly we consider the multiplicative scheme. If the dynamics µ of a histories
theory (Ω,Σ, µ) is known then we might prefer to use the multiplicative scheme
M(Ω,Σ, µ) rather than the full set of multiplicative coevents Σ∗. For the above this
could mean replacing Σ∗ withM(Ω,Σ, µ) as the base poset of our topos; which would
become SetsM(Ω,Σ,µ). Since M(Ω,Σ, µ) ⊂ Σ∗ it is easy to check that the above
analysis holds; however primitivity ensures that M(Ω,Σ, µ) is an anti-chain so the
structures based on the constant varying set △M(Ω,Σ, µ) may not be particularly
illuminating.
These caveats made we conclude that we can formulate multiplicative coevents in
a manner that allows the application of topos theory as used in [22], though this con-
struction does not generalise to arbitrary coevent schemes and may not be interesting
for the multiplicative scheme. This formulation enables us to utilise new methods
in understanding coevents, for example by expressing multiplicative coevents within
the comprehensive framework introduced by Isham and Do¨ring in [3]. Further, such
constructions provide a context in which multiplicative coevents might be compared
to other approaches to ‘quantum logic’.
4 Conclusion
Our aim was to develop a logical framework for coevents, taking them ‘seriously’ as
beables, using this to compare propositions concerning coevents with propositions
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concerning histories. Outlining our general approach in section 2.1, we identified
the lattice of coevent propositions as 2V and introduced the map τ which allows us
to represent histories propositions in Σ as elements of τ(Σ) ⊂ 2V ; we found that a
comparison of the two logical structures then reduced to a comparison of the lattice
structure pushed forward from Σ to τ(Σ) and the lattice structure inherited by τ(Σ)
from 2V . Applying these ideas to multiplicative coevents in section 2.2 we found that
the map τ took the elegant form τ(A) =↑ (A∗), leading to the equivalence of the
pushed forward and inherited orderings on the image of τ , ≤τ=≤⊆ |F∗ . However
this did not lead to the two lattice structures being equivalent, in fact we found that
∧τ = ∧⊆|F∗ but ∨τ 6= ∨⊆|F∗ reflecting the anhomomorphic nature of multiplicative
coevents, as became more clear once we considered the truth valuations fφ. We
further considered how this analysis might apply to the multiplicative scheme and
more general coevent schemes in sections 2.2.4 and 2.2.5. In section 3 we noticed that
the map τ intuitively resembled topos notions of truth valuation, and used this as
a handle to suggest a means by which topos theory (as applied by Isham) might be
applied to multiplicative coevents; a result which we hope opens the way for future
research.
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